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GAMECHANGE: CORD CUTTERS, TECHNOLOGY, AND 
THE LEGALITIES OF THE RACE TO REPLACE CABLE  
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JULIE D. PFAFF** 
AMY HENDRICKSON*** 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Technology has changed the entertainment landscape since the advent 
of widespread Internet-based distribution networks such as Netflix in 2008.1 
Cord Cutters, or entertainment consumers who no longer use traditional cable 
or satellite outlets as content suppliers, now make up over 13% of all 
consumers under age thirty-five.2 The pace of this sea change is quickly 
accelerating.3 Online groups, some even ironically hosted by traditional 
providers themselves,4 have become missionaries for the shift with quasi-
                                                   
*  J.D., LL.M., CISSP, Associate Professor of Business Law, West Chester University of 
Pennsylvania. 
** J.D., M.A., Adjunct Professor of Business Law & Communications, West Chester 
University of Pennsylvania. 
*** J.D., M.B.A., Assistant Professor of Law, Saginaw Valley State University. 
1 Ken Auletta, Annals of Communications, Outside the Box, THE NEW YORKER, February 3, 
2014, at 54. 
2 Janko Roettgers, Cord Cutters Alert:  5 Percent Of Broadband Users Watch All Of Their TV 
Online, GIGAOM (Aug 1, 2013), http://gigaom.com/2013/08/01/five-percent-cord-cutters/ 
(Noting that as of August 2013, 5 percent of internet broadband consumers utilize only online 
video services.  The article also notes that 40 percent of broadband users use some online 
sources for TV, 70 percent of under-35 year olds with broadband access stream some of their 
entertainment, and 13 percent of under-35 year olds stream all of their content from the 
internet without the use of traditional cable).  
3 See Jim Edwards, TV is Dying, And Here Are The Stats That Prove It, BUSINESS 
INSIDER(Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/cord-cutters-and-the-death-of-tv-
2013-11 (Noting after a discussion of the collapse of broadcast and cable TV subscriptions 
that “[w]e’re at the beginning of a major historical shift from watching TV to watching video 
— including TV shows and movies — on the internet or on mobile devices.”); Alex Tretbar, 
Morgan Stanley Study Points To A Steadily Growing Number Of Cord-Cutters, DIGITAL 
TRENDS (March 14, 2014), http://www.digitaltrends.com/home-theater/morgan-stanley-report-
us-tv-subscribers-to-cut-cord-2014; Farhad Manjoo, Comcast vs. the Cord Cutters, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/business/media/comcast-
vs-the-cord-cutters.html. 
4 Cord Cutting 101, DIGITAL TRENDS, http://www.digitaltrends.com/topic/cord-cutting-101/ 
(hosted by “The Digital Trends Connected Home Presented By Verizon Fios”) (last visited 
July 9, 2014).   
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religious zeal. A representative Cord Cutting website proclaims: “A 
revolution has begun. Fed up with constantly increasing prices, endless fees 
and taxes, and programming packages that include forty channels you don’t 
want for every one that you do, cable and satellite customers across the US 
are kicking their service providers to the curb by cutting the cord and 
sourcing their TV programming elsewhere.”5 In fact, all three authors are 
Cord Cutters, and none have traditional cable or satellite service in their 
respective households. 
But the law has not kept pace with the advance of technology that has 
made Cord Cutting possible6 and at present there are many unanswered legal 
questions concerning content delivery mechanisms that belie the state of the 
technologic art.7 There are additional content delivery restrictions8 enfeebling 
technologies that are quickly replacing cable television. This paper attempts 
to provide a brief history, to summarize the current state of the relevant 
technologies and the applicable law, and to make predictions for the 
evolution of that legal environment that will shape the growth of these new 
content delivery mechanisms in the coming decade.  
 
II. BEFORE BROADBAND – B.C. & D.C. ‒ A PRIMER ON THE 
PREVIOUS AND CURRENT ERAS 
 
In the era before the current one, which we term B.C., (that is “Before 
Cable”),9 television was broadcast using analog signals over regional 
antenna towers to an unlimited number of television owners with their own, 
                                                   
5 Id. 
6 See generally Note, Enabling Television Competition In A Converged Market, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 2083 (2013). 
7 See James Grimmelmann, Why Johnny Can’t Stream:  How Video Copyright Went Insane, 
ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 30, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/08/why-johnny-cant-
stream-how-video-copyright-went-insane/  (“Deploying 10,000 tiny antennas makes no 
technical sense – but the law demands it.”). 
8 See Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussed in more detail supra); see 
generally the other continuing controversies regarding network neutrality, including those 
compiled in the Forty-Third Selected Bibliography On Computers, Technology And The Law, 
38 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 277, 376 (2012); Larry Downes, Unscrambling the 
FCC’s Net Neutrality Order: Preserving the Open Internet - - But Which One?, 20 COMM. 
LAW CONSPECTUS 83 (2011); Daniel A. Lyons, Virtual Takings: The Coming Fifth Amendment 
Challenge to Net Neutrality Regulation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 65 (2011); Eric Null, The 
Difficulty with Regulating Network Neutrality, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 459 (2011); 
Caroline S. Scala, The FCC’s Role in Regulating Network Neutrality: Protection of Online 
Innovation & Business, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 419 (2011); James B. Speta, Supervising Managed 
Services, 60 DUKE L.J. 1715 (2011); Jennifer Wong, Net Neutrality: Preparing for the Future, 
31 J. NAT’L ASS’N L. JUD. 669 (2011); Christopher S. Yoo, Technologies of Control and the 
Future of the First Amendment, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747 (2011).   
9 Pun intended.   
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smaller household antennas that received the signal.10 There were no fees 
charged to the individual consumer for right to view the television 
programming available to the viewing public. These Over-the-Air (or 
“OTA”) broadcast television stations were—and continue to be—either 
publicly supported stations (for instance, the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting11) or they were supported through advertisers’ purchase of 
airtime12 from the stations and networks in order to broadcast commercials to 
the viewing public.13  
The current era, which we term D.C. (“During Cable”), arose with the 
growth of today’s traditional cable industry and later with the advent of 
satellite television. According the FCC, “Cable television (originally called 
CATV or community antenna television) was developed in the late 1940’s 
for communities unable to receive TV signals because of terrain or distance 
from TV stations.”14   
The FCC’s authority to regulate cable was first granted in the original 
1934 Communications Act, although cable itself did not exist at the time.15 
                                                   
10 The first television station appeared in the late 1920’s.  The First Television Show, POPULAR 
MECHANICS, August 1930, at 177-79, available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=iuIDAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PA177&dq=Popular%20Science
%201930%20plane%20%22Popular%20Mechanics%22&pg=PA177#v=onepage&q&f=true  
(last visited July 9, 2014); Golden Age, 1930’s Through 1950’s, Federal Communications 
Commission, available at http://transition.fcc.gov/omd/history/tv/1930-1959.html (last visited 
July 9, 2014). 
11 47 U.S.C. 396 (k)(3)(B)(i) (1967) (“The Corporation shall utilize the funds allocated 
pursuant to subparagraph (A)(ii)(II) and subparagraph (A)(iii)(II) to make grants for 
production of public television or radio programs by independent producers and production 
entities and public telecommunications entities, producers of national children's educational 
programming, and producers of programs addressing the needs and interests of minorities, and 
for acquisition of such programs by public telecommunications entities.”). 
12 This airtime-driven model is breaking down.  “Television advertising, once viewed as the 
pillar of advertising media outlets, is facing numerous challenges from alternative media (e.g., 
Internet) and from the invasion of technology devices, such as digital video recorders (DVR) 
that have empowered customers to be more selective when choosing advertisements to view. 
To combat this, many networks and local television stations have altered the types of 
advertising they permit, including offering ads with shorter runtimes (e.g., 15-second ads) or 
longer run-times (e.g., 30-minute infomercial).”  PAUL CHRIST, KNOWTHIS: MARKETING 
BASICS, 2ND ED., 237, KNOWTHIS MEDIA, (2012). 
13 See BIA/Kelsey Reports Local Television Revenues Rose 23.2% to $19.4 Billion in 2010, 
Driven by Political Campaigns and National Advertising, BIA KELSEY, 
http://www.biakelsey.com/Company/Press-Releases/110429-Local-Television-Revenues-
Rose-23.2-Percent-to-$19.4-Billion-in-2010.asp  (last visited July 9, 2014).  
14 Federal Communications Commission, FCC Encyclopedia, Evolution of Cable Television, 
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/evolution-cable-television#evol 
(last visited July 9, 2014). 
15 See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968); see generally 
F.C.C. v. Midwest Video Corp, 99 S.Ct. 1435 (1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. F.C.C., 567 
F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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The FCC first attempted to do so in regulations in 1965 and 1966, which 
were confirmed in the Southwestern Cable Co. case in 1968.16 The 1934 Act 
was amended by the Cable Communications Act of 1984.17  Since the 1984 
Act Congress and the FCC have continually exerted varying degrees of 
control over traditional cable broadcasters.18 This included rate and capacity 
controls embodied in the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 199219 and the deregulating influence of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.20   
Satellite based television services had a more recent evolution but are 
still subject to extensive regulation. “Until 1988, satellite providers could not 
legally transmit network broadcasting to their customers because Congress 
had not provided satellite providers with statutory protection from copyright 
infringement.”21  In that year Congress enacted the Satellite Home Viewer 
Act of 1988.22 The 1988 Act “[w]as designed to limit satellite transmission of 
network programming to unserved households because advertisers and 
broadcasters were concerned that if urban households were permitted to 
subscribe to distant networks, those households would stop watching their 
local affiliates in favor of the distant networks.”23 Unserved households were 
narrowly defined to exclude households within reach of the generally urban-
sited transmission towers.24 The essential problem with this regime was that 
the bulk of the viewing public was located in urban and suburban areas,25 and 
therefore were not classified as “unserved.”26 This meant that the bulk of the 
potential satellite audience couldn’t be supplied with what was most in 
                                                   
16 392 U.S. at 178. 
17 47 U.S.C. §521 et. seq. 
18 For a more in depth discussion of the regulation of classic cable television, see Jeffrey E. 
Wallace, Contextual Regulation of Indecency: A Happy Medium for Cable Television, 21 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 193, 195-99 (2011). 
19 Pub.L. 102-385 (1992). 
20 Pub.L. 104−104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).   
21 Kevin W. Harris, I Want my MTV . . . and My ABC, CBS, NBC, and FOX: CBS 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Echostar Communications Corp., The Satellite Home Viewer Act Of 
1988, And An Argument For Consumer Choice In Distant Network Broadcasting, 2007 
B.Y.U. L.REV. 1055, 1060 (2007).  
2217 U.S.C. §119, Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988 (SHVA), title II, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 
102 Stat. 3935, 3949 (1988). 
232007 B.Y.U. L.REV. at 1063. 
2417 U.S.C. § 119(d)(10)(A-E) (2000); see also the discussion at 2007 B.Y.U.L.REV. at 1061-
62.   
25See Paul Christ, Television Advertising, (2014), KNOWTHIS.COM, 
http://www.knowthis.com/types-of-advertising-media/television-advertising (last visited Oct. 
30, 2014); see generally Franklin M. Fisher, John J. McGowan & David S. Evans, The 
Audience-Revenue Relationship for Local Television Stations, 11 THE BELL JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMICS 694 (1980) (Discussing in part the relationship of audience size and characteristics 
to revenue and appeal). 
26Supra note 24. 
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demand—content from their local network affiliates.27 In order to secure 
those local signals, satellite consumers were forced to install secondary OTA 
antennas to receive analog broadcasts from the local transmission towers.28 
That situation changed relatively quickly.  Within the next decade the Home 
Viewer Improvement Act of 199929 significantly expanded satellite 
broadcasting to become a functional equal of cable providers within the 
marketplace by permitting satellite companies to provide local broadcast 
channels otherwise accessible OTA to all subscribers in that local market.30 
“This ability to provide local broadcast channels is commonly referred to as 
‘local into local’ service.”31  
A primary differentiator between television in the B.C. era and the D.C. 
era is the fact that satellite and cable providers receive a significant portion of 
their income not just from advertisers32 but also from retransmission fees33 
and subscriber fees.34 “The vast majority of these revenues consist of 
subscription fees paid by consumers and businesses for video programming, 
high–speed Internet access, telephone services, and related equipment.”35 
                                                   
27 Stephen Super, Congress Gives Satellite Viewers Local Station Option, 6 B. U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 329 (2000).  
28 Id.; Incidentally, the FCC has authority to regulate the placement of satellite dishes and 
antennae with a limited preemption of local ordinances. The FCC ban limits imposed by state 
and local governments that hinder installation, maintenance or use of video antennas less than 
one meter in diameter (or larger within Alaska).  47 C.F.R. §1.4000.  Pursuant to the ban, 
restrictions that unreasonably delay or prevent installation, maintenance or use; (2) 
unreasonably increase the cost of installation, maintenance or use; or (3) preclude reception of 
an acceptable quality signal are impermissible.  Id. at (a)(3)(i-iii).  The rule applies to rented 
properties too.  Id. at (a)(1).  For a detailed review of the law surrounding that authority, see 
Christopher Neumann, FCC Preemption of Zoning Ordinances That Restrict Satellite Dish 
Antenna Placement: Sound Policy or Legislative Overkill?, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 635 (1997). 
2917 U.S.C. §122 (2011). 
30Id. at §122(a)(1-2). 
31Federal Communications Commission, FAQS – Satellite, FED. COMMC’NS COM’N 
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/faqs-satellite#shvia (last visited July 9, 2014). 
32 See supra note 25. 
33 See discussion, infra.  Retransmission fees are at the center of current litigation that directly 
impacts the industry and the Cord Cutting movement.  
34 See Bortz Media & Sports Group, Inc., Cable Across America: An Economic Impact Report 
(2012), NAT’L CABLE & TELECOMM. ASS’N, https://www.ncta.com/sites/prod/files/bortz.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2014).  
35 Id. at 9; For exceptionally detailed discussions of the finances of cable providers in the D.C. 
era see also 2012 Time Warner Cable Annual Report, TIME WARNER CABLE, 
http://ir.timewarnercable.com/files/doc_financials/Annual%20Reports/468244_010.pdf (last 
visited July 9, 2014); Comcast 2012 Annual Review, COMCAST, 
http://www.comcast.com/2012annualreview/d/CMCSA_AR12_full_10K.pdf?SCRedirect=tru
e?SCRedirect=true (last visited July 9, 2014); c.f. Verizon 2012 Annual Review, VERIZON, 
http://www.verizon.com/investor/app_resources/interactiveannual/2012/downloads/12_vz_ar.
pdf (last visited July 9, 2014). 
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Advertising has taken a back seat to the subscription model36 that currently 
raises such ire with the viewing public.37 
This cable/satellite situation at the height of the D.C. era at the turn of 
and in the first decade of the millennium is the “classic” view of the home 
consumer entertainment landscape.38  The vast majority of entertainment 
consumers received their content in one of four ways: either through their 
cable company exclusively; through their satellite broadcaster exclusively; 
through the functional equivalent of a cable company such as Verizon Fios 
exclusively;39 or through OTA Analog signals exclusively.40   
 
III. AFTER CABLE – THE LEGAL AND TECHNICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
The now-waning D.C. (“During Cable”) era is rather quickly being 
eclipsed by an emerging era that the authors term A.C. (“After Cable”).41  
Although we are not yet fully immersed in this new phase—consider this a 
transitional period—four necessary events were predicates for the current rise 
of the A.C. era. Although inextricably interrelated, two of these events are 
technological predicates and the remainder are legal predicates.  
 
  
                                                   
36 Supra note 12. 
37 Supra note 4. 
38 See Big Bets for the U.S. Cable Industry, Key Opportunities for Future Revenue Growth, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (2005), www.pwc.com/us/en/...center/.../mso_wb-x.pdf  (“At the 
same time, the pool of subscribers to multi-channel video services is unlikely to grow beyond 
where it stands today: 86 percent of U.S. television households. The majority of those 
subscribers are served by cable. The remaining subscribers are served either by satellite 
television, the cable industry’s established competitor, or by a telecommunications carrier 
[such as Verizon Fios], an emerging competitor.”) 
39Id. 
40Current estimates range between 7% and 20% of the viewing public. Pro-broadcast company 
surveys tend to cite the lower figure, and pro-Cord Cutting surveys tend to present higher 
numbers.  “The most recent study found that [7] percent of [OTA] households rely solely on 
antennas for TV reception. The CEA’s estimate stands in contrast to figures released by media 
analysts at GfK, publisher of The Home Technology Monitor. GfK found that 19.3 percent of 
American households—as many as 60 million Americans—rely exclusively on over-the-air 
TV.”   TV Technology Staff, CEA Study Says Seven Percent of TV Households Use Antennas, 
TV TECH. (Jul. 30, 2013), http://www.tvtechnology.com/article/cea-study-says-seven-percent-
of-tv-households-use-antennas-/220585. 
41The authors considered the term B.E. (“Broadband Era”) for this nascent period.  However, 
we discarded the term for two reasons: first, because broadband – defined here as always-on 
internet capable of 3 gigabit per second or better download speeds – is a technology that could 
be replaced without changing the underlying premises of this article; and second, because the 
AC/DC mnemonic conjures images of a certain 1980s hair band at the height of cable’s MTV 
Music Television ascendancy – thus making it easy to recall.    
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A. Technological Predicates 
 
The technological predicates, broadband internet access,42 and the rise 
of Netflix and its imitators,43 directly accelerated the current transition to the 
A.C. era.  Indeed, the A.C. era would not be possible without them.  
 
1. Broadband 
 
Broadband internet access seems ubiquitous today.  It is, however, a 
creature of the first decade of this century.44 There are numerous technical 
and enthusiast descriptions of the rise of broadband internet, but one of the 
better descriptions of the rise of broadband internet access in a legal context 
is contained in 2014’s Verizon v. F.C.C.:45 “In the Internet’s early days, most 
users connected to the Internet through dial-up connections over local 
telephone lines.”46 Recall the old America Online commercials and the flood 
of sign-up disks in your mailbox circa 1999.47 Those outmoded computer 
disks enabled dialup telephone access to the internet at slow speeds orders of 
magnitude below current standards.48 “Today, access is generally furnished 
through “broadband,” i.e., high-speed communications technologies, such as 
cable modem service.”49  The authors define broadband as always-on internet 
capable of 3 gigabit per second or better download speeds50 because that 
speed can provide DVD or better quality streaming video.51  
Broadband’s rise created a virtuous cycle of new products and new 
technologies feeding upon the growth of the other: “[h]igher-speed 
residential Internet connections in the late 1990s ‘stimulated’ the 
                                                   
42 See the discussion of Broadband, infra. 
43 See the discussion of Netflix and Its Imitators, infra. 
44 See Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
45 Id. at 629. 
46 Id., citing In re Inquiry Concerning High–Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802–03 ¶ 9 (2002). 
47 See M.G. Siegler, How Much Did It Cost AOL To Send Us Those CDs In The 90s? "A Lot!," 
Says Steve Case, TECH CRUNCH (Dec. 27, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/12/27/aol-discs-
90s/. 
48 56 kilobits per second was the standard dialup internet connection speed.  Alex Freeman, 
Why is 56k the fastest dialup modem speed?, 10 STRIPE, http://www.10stripe.com/articles/why-
is-56k-the-fastest-dialup-modem-speed.php (last visited July 9, 2014).    That speed is .018% 
of one of the slowest broadband speeds, 3gbs.  See Supra note 41.  
49 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 629, citing In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 25 
F.C.C.R. 9556, 9557, 9558–59 ¶¶ 1, 4 (2010) (“Sixth Broadband Deployment Report ”); 47 
U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1) (2013) 
50 Supra note 41. 
51 Infra note 54. 
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development of streaming video,52 a service that requires particularly high 
bandwidth, “which in turn encouraged broadband providers to increase 
network speeds.”53 The transition from dialup internet to broadband has been 
accomplished quite quickly.54 According data from the Pew Internet 
Research Project as of September 2013, 70% of Americans had access to 
broadband internet access at home.55 Compare the current penetration of 
broadband to the situation at the turn of the century: “In June 2000, when 
about half of adults were online [using dialup], only 3% of American 
households had broadband access.”56 The increase in dramatic and it is the 
great enabler of the A.C. era. 
 
2. The Rise of Netflix and Its Imitators 
 
Netflix is an integral part of the race to replace cable. Netflix began in 
1997 as a mail-in (via “snailmail”57) competitor to established video rental 
services like Blockbuster Video.58 Subscribers would choose movies on the 
Netflix website and the company would—and it still does—mail a rental 
DVD or Blu-Ray movie to the subscriber.59 In 2002 the Netflix Annual 
Report described their business as follows: “Our subscribers never go to the 
video store on a Saturday night to rent a movie—or make a return trip to 
avoid a late fee. Instead, Netflix offers our subscribers direct home delivery 
of their DVD selections, usually the next day.”60 After viewing was 
complete, the subscriber would mail the movie back to Netflix.61  In fact, 
                                                   
52 See the discussion of Netflix, supra. 
53 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 644, citing Open Internet Order, 25 F.C.C.R. at 17911 ¶ 14 n. 23. 
54 PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT, Broadband Technology Fact Sheet, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/broadband-technology-fact-sheet/ (last visited July 9, 
2014). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Defined as “the conventional postal system, as opposed to electronic mail.”  
DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/snail+mail (last visited July 9, 
2014). 
58 NetFlix Media Center, A Brief History of the Company That Revolutionized Watching of 
Movies and TV Shows, NETFLIX, 
https://pr.netflix.com/WebClient/loginPageSalesNetWorksAction.do?contentGroupId=10477
&contentGroup=Company+Timeline (last visited July 9, 2014). 
59 See Netflix Annual Report 2002, 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/NFLX/3041394245x0x16168/7C8B7B63-6DC2-
45D5-AC8F-424C27C6D2C9/2002AR-print.pdf (last visited July 9, 2014). 
60 Id. at 3.  
61 Id. 
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volume was such that Netflix was able to negotiate—at least for a time—
special rates and treatment from the U.S. Postal Service.62  
The rise of broadband63 enabled the transition of Netflix from a mail-
based subscription service to an on-demand streaming video service that has 
profoundly impacted the entertainment landscape.  In 2007 “Netflix 
introduce[d] streaming, which allows members to instantly watch television 
shows and movies on their personal computers.”64 Broadband internet access 
of at least 3gbs is required for internet video streaming at DVD level 
quality.65  The combination of a low pricing model,66 and broadband access 
that had reached 70% of the American population67 by 2012 changed 
Netflix’s business model. In 2012 the video streaming model clearly 
dominated the company’s growth efforts and revenue streams, and Netflix 
streaming began to stimulate change within the industry.  Netflix describes 
its growth as such in its 2012 annual report: 
 
Netflix, Inc. . . . is the world’s leading Internet television network 
with more than 33 million members in over 40 countries enjoying 
more than one billion hours of TV shows and movies per month, 
including original series. For one low monthly price, our members 
can watch as much as they want, anytime, anywhere, on nearly any 
Internet-connected screen. Additionally, in the United States 
(“U.S.”), our subscribers can receive standard definition DVDs, 
and their high definition successor, Blu-ray discs . . . delivered 
quickly to their homes.68 
 
Netflix has many imitators and competitors. Netflix itself describes the 
competitive video streaming market over broadband as follows:  
                                                   
62 See GameFly Inc. v. Postal Regulatory Commission, 704 F.3d 145, (D.C. Cir. 2013) (In 
discussing the costs of mailing disks back and forth through the traditional mails, the court 
noted that “[t]he Postal Service has saved Netflix—apparently its biggest DVD mailer 
customer—from this crippling otherwise industry-wide problem by diverting Netflix mail 
from the automated letter stream, shifting it to specially designated trays and containers, hand 
culling it, and hand processing it. Rather obviously, this is not without cost to the Postal 
Service. Nonetheless, the Service provides it to Netflix free of charge.”)  Id. at 146-47.    
63 See the discussion of Broadband, supra. 
64 Supra note 58. 
65 How fast should my Internet connection be to watch Netflix?, NETFLIX, 
https://help.netflix.com/en/node/306 (last visited July 9, 2014). 
66 $7.99 per month for unlimited streaming in 2014.  See landing page at 
https://www.netflix.com/ (last visited July 9, 2014). 
67 Supra note 54. 
68 See Netflix Annual Report 2012 at 1, 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/NFLX/3041394245x0x658002/2604be28-a3d3-49e6-
a504-df6cb4856a02/2012_10K.pdf (last visited July 9, 2014). 
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Multichannel video programming distributors . . . with free TV 
Everywhere applications such as HBO GO or Showtime Anytime 
in the U.S. . . . and other on demand content from cable providers, 
such as Time Warner and Comcast; direct broadcast satellite 
providers, such as DIRECTV and Echostar; . . . telecommunication 
providers such as AT&T and Verizon “Over-the-top” Internet 
movie and TV content providers, such as, Amazon.com’s Prime 
Video, Hulu.com and Hulu Plus, LOVEFiLM, Clarovideo, 
Viaplay, and Google’s YouTube, [and] [t]ransactional content 
providers, such as Apple’s iTunes, Amazon’s Instant Video, 
GooglePlay, and Vudu.69 
 
What this means in practical terms is that entertainment consumers are 
no longer tied to the traditional “classic” view of the home consumer 
entertainment landscape discussed supra.70 They can stream, instantly, very 
high quality high definition streams71 from a variety of providers.72 That 
technical capability, however, is not enough to instigate a transition from the 
classic cable model.  Streaming video alone, even on ultra-fast broadband 
connections,73 without other legal enabling laws, does not provide the 
consumer with high quality versions of the traditional network channels74 – 
those channels that the average member of the public consider to be basic 
                                                   
69 Id. at 2.  
70 Supra note 38. 
71 These video streams, their quality, and the impact of same on viewer behaviors have been 
extensively studied in other disciplines.  See Krishnan, S. Shunmuga, & Ramesh K. Sitaraman. 
“Video stream quality impacts viewer behavior: inferring causality using quasi-experimental 
designs.” In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Internet measurement conference, 
pp. 211-24. ACM, 2012; see generally Balachandran, Athula, Vyas Sekar, Aditya Akella, 
Srinivasan Seshan, Ion Stoica, & Hui Zhang. “Developing a predictive model of quality of 
experience for internet video.” In Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2013 conference on 
SIGCOMM, pp. 339-350. ACM, 2013; Liu, Xi, Florin Dobrian, Henry Milner, Junchen Jiang, 
Vyas Sekar, Ion Stoica, & Hui Zhang. “A case for a coordinated internet video control plane.” 
In Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2012 conference on Applications, technologies, 
architectures, and protocols for computer communication, pp. 359-370. ACM, 2012. 
72 Supra note 69. 
73 Google Fiber, for instance, is now available in limited areas and is extremely fast at “[u]p to 
1,000 Mbps, Google Fiber is 100 times faster than today’s basic broadband.” The goodness of 
Internet and TV. Times 100., GOOGLE FIBER, https://fiber.google.com/about/ (last visited July 
9, 2014). 
74 Defined here as ABC, NBC, CBS (the original broadcast networks). Douglas Blanks 
Hindman & Kenneth Wiegand, The Big Three’s Prime-Time Decline: A Technological and 
Social Context, 52(1) JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA, 119 (2008). We 
also include newer broadcast networks such as FOX, ION, CW, MyNetworkTV, and, among 
Spanish language viewers, Telemundo and Univision.  Id. at 120.   
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requirements of a television entertainment package.75 For that portion of our 
analysis we turn to the legal predicates of the A.C. era.  
 
B. Legal Predicates 
 
Two legal predicates, the forced Digital OTA Television Transition76 
and the Cablevision Litigation77 enabled the current transition to the A.C. era. 
Without these legal spurs towards the future the growth of Cord Cutting 
behavior would have been severely curtailed.  
 
1. The Analog to Digital OTA Television Transition 
 
The broadcast networks continued to broadcast analog signals well into 
the 21st century.78 These analog signals were of middling quality79 and by 
their very nature as non-digital signals there were limitations to what those 
signals could achieve for the end user.80  
However, emerging technologies, increasingly crowded airwaves and 
the chance to burnish the public treasury birthed The Digital Television 
Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005.81 Originally “[i]n the U.S., 
regulations for the transition from analog to digital over- the-air broadcast 
were initiated by the Federal Communications Commission and amended and 
modified by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Balanced Budget 
Act of 1997.”82 “In the section of the [Telecommunications Act of 199683] 
pertaining to broadcasting, Congress directed the FCC to provide new 
licenses (at no cost) to incumbent broadcasters for the provision of [digital 
over the air] broadcasting under the condition that broadcasters would have 
                                                   
75 See Comcast, Differences Between Limited Basic and Expanded Basic Cable, COMCAST 
https://customer.comcast.com/help-and-support/cable-tv/difference-between-limited-basic-
and-expanded-basic-cable/ (last visited May 28, 2014)(discussing the differences between 
Limited Basic Cable and higher tier cable packages, which serves as a proxy for the basic 
requirements of the average consumer). 
76 See the discussion of The Analog to Digital OTA Television Transition, infra. 
77 See the discussion of The “Cablevision” Case - Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, infra. 
78 See Eugene Ho, The Constitutional Right to Watch Television: Analyzing the Digital 
Switchover in the Context of the First Amendment.” 57 AM. UNIV. LAW REVIEW 179 (2007).   
79See 10 Frequently Asked Questions about Digital & High Definition TV, WGVU PUBLIC 
MEDIA, http://www.wgvu.org/home/dcpdfs/10faqs.pdf (last visited July 9, 2014). 
80 Id.  
81 Pub. L. No. 109-171, §§ 3001-3013, 120 Stat. 4, 21-28 (2006). 
82 Joshua T. Block, Regulating the Transition From Analog to Digital Television Broadcasting 
in North America: 
A Comparison of the Canadian, U.S., And Mexican Experiences, 17 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 20, 21 
(2008). 
83 Pub. L. No. 104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
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to return either the new or original analog license at some date.”84 This was 
Congress’s “carrot” to spur a transition to a digital broadcasting future. 
The Balanced Budget Act of 199785 supplemented the 1996 Act’s86 
“carrot” with a “stick” that required an end to analog broadcasting by the end 
of 2006.87 But at the same time it undercut the 2006 hard-and-fast date by 
permitting extensions past the 2006 deadline.88 “If 85 percent of households 
in any given market either did not have DTV-ready receivers or were 
subscribers of cable or satellite, the deadlines would not apply and the DTV 
transition in that market would not proceed.”89 Because of the extensions 
written into the law and the facts on the ground—“[b]y 2005, only 3.3 
percent of television households were capable of receiving DTV signals”90—
there was little chance of a timely, smooth, or orderly transition. The Digital 
Television Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005 provided a hard date for 
the transition with no extensions past the final analog broadcast date of 
February 17, 2009. 91   
The February 2009 date, too, was pushed back as concerns regarding 
public readiness grew.  The new Obama administration promulgated the 
DTV Delay Act that provided a new deadline of June 12, 2009.92 Since that 
date for all intents and purposes the Digital OTA Television Transition has 
been complete. 
The reaction to the transition has been positive. “Ultimately, the change 
will have a positive effect for consumers because [digital television] provides 
better sound, sharper images, and more viewing options than have ever been 
available over the air.”93 “Many commentators consider [broadcast digital 
television] to be the most significant development in television technology 
since the advent of color TV.”94  
 
Outside of the realm of the Cord Cutter a]n important benefit of the 
switch to all-digital broadcasting is that parts of the valuable 
broadcast spectrum have been freed up for public safety 
communications by groups such as police, fire departments and 
                                                   
84 James Miller & James E. Prieger, The Broadcasters’ Transition Date Roulette: Strategic 
Aspects Of The DTV  
Transition, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L 437, 463 (2011). 
85 See supra note 82. 
86 Supra note 83. 
87 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L at 463. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 464.  
91 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(14) (2006). 
92 DTV Delay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-4, 123 Stat. 112 (2009). 
93 17 MEDIA L. & POL’Y at 20. 
94 57 AM. UNIV. L. REV. at 181. 
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rescue squads. Also, some of the spectrum has been auctioned to 
companies that will be able to provide consumers with advanced 
wireless services, such as wireless broadband.95 
 
For the Cord Cutter the Digital OTA Television Transition provides an 
experience comparable to, and arguably better than, the experience provided 
by cable and satellite providers with regard to local broadcast channels. That 
experience is free of monthly fees and subscriptions. Commentators have 
succinctly described the improvements Digital OTA provides over analog 
television signals, including the ability to receive uncompressed high 
definition (“HDTV”) signals:  
 
Viewers cannot ignore the dramatic improvements offered by the 
DTV conversion. Visually, HDTV captures viewers with crystal 
clear resolution and razor sharp detail. Individual hairs, labels on 
footballs and the subtle effect of wind blowing through grass are all 
clearly visible through HDTV. Also, the detailed resolution and 
color provides an image similar to a movie-theater screen. 
Combined with the capacity to deliver enhanced Dolby Digital 
surround sound, HDTV produces an advanced home theater effect. 
DTV provides viewers with sharper images, better sound, and more 
viewing options than have ever been available over the air.96 
 
It is axiomatic that traditional television providers charge fees to 
consumers to access television channels through the “classic” routes: their 
cable company; their satellite broadcaster; or through the functional 
equivalent of a cable company such as Verizon Fios.97 Those fees continue to 
outpace the rate of inflation:   
 
The Federal Communications Commission reported this week that 
average cable television bills nationwide jumped by 5.8 percent in 
the one-year period through July [2013], considerably higher than 
the 3.7 percent increase in the price of all goods and services.98 
 
                                                   
95 Digital Television, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/digital-television (last 
visited July 9, 2014). 
96 Supra note 79. 
97 Supra note 39. 
98 Mark Baumgartner, Average Cable Rates on the Rise, ABC NEWS (Feb. 16, 2014), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=88614. 
192/Vol. XXV/Southern Law Journal 
 
That average bill is expected to be $123 per month in 2015.99 Yet the 
paid, cable and satellite versions of the broadcast channels provide an 
inferior product when compared to the uncompressed Digital OTA HDTV 
signals available for free.  Most, if not all, cable and satellite providers to 
some degree compress their digital signals by removing image information 
from the channels that they sent to their subscribers.100  They are forced to do 
this because of the current state of technology and the limits of the “pipe” 
connecting them to their customer base.101 This is not the case with Digital 
OTA HDTV signals.  Those signals are generally not as compressed or 
uncompressed.102 Therefore, they are sent in their purest form, with markedly 
higher quality for free to the consumer.  In 2012-2013, 94 of the top 100 
rated television shows were offered by networks that broadcast Digital OTA 
HDTV signals through their local affiliates.103   
Therefore, the Digital OTA Transition has enabled a situation where 
with regard to the major network broadcast channels the consumer has a 
choice of a demonstrably inferior, yet expensive, subscription model to a 
traditional provider’s services, or the choice of free higher quality signals for 
the exact same programming. That programming is most of the programming 
that most people watch.104  That fact has been instrumental to the Cord Cutter 
Movement.  
 
2. The “Cablevision” Case - Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings 
 
Perhaps one of the most influential legal predicates—one to test the 
limits of digital recordings of coaxial cable transmissions—occurred in 2007 
                                                   
99 The NPD Group: Average Monthly Pay-TV Subscription Bills May Top $200 by 2020, NPD 
GROUP (Apr. 10, 2012), https://www.npd.com/wps/portal/npd/us/news/press-
releases/pr_120410/. 
100 Chis Williams, Cable's Crunched Signals Irritate HD Die-Hards, ABC NEWS, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=4691553 (last visited July 9, 2014). 
101 Id.  See also Robert Silva, Macroblocking and Pixelation - Similarities and Differences, 
HOME THEATER, http://hometheater.about.com/od/hometheatervideobasics/qt/Macroblocking-
And-Pixelation-Similarities-And-Differences.htm (last visited July 9, 2014). 
102 See Dwight Silverman, The Houston Chronicle, Cord-cutting on the cheap: Over-the-air 
HDTV saved to a Boxee DVR, CHRON, (Oct. 9, 2012), 
http://blog.chron.com/techblog/2012/10/cord-cutting-on-the-cheap-over-the-air-hdtv-saved-to-
a-boxee-dvr/  (“It’s an irony of the age of digital television that the best picture you can get on 
your big-screen, HDTV comes from old-school, rabbit-ear antennas. Yep, the free TV you get 
from your local broadcast station has a less-compressed signal than those delivered by cable 
TV, which means the visuals are a lot better.”)   
103 See, e.g., TVB Local Media Marketing Solutions, Seasons of Premieres: Fall Broadcast and 
Summer Cable,  TELEVISION BUREAU OF ADVER., 
http://www.tvb.org/research/2053636/summer_primetime_broadcast (last visited July 9, 
2014).  
104 Id. 
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with the Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings case (commonly referred to as 
Cablevision).105 The case arose from Cablevision’s March 2006 
announcement offering subscribers a new “Remote Storage DVR system” 
(RS-DVR) feature. This technology, much like a set-top DVR, would permit 
subscribers to record cable programming and to play the recorded content on 
demand, using their remote control and their Cablevision cable box.106 
Cablevision’s content providers and copyright holders (hereafter referred to 
as “plaintiffs”) sued Cablevision, alleging the operation of the RS-DVR 
would directly infringe upon their right to control the reproduction and public 
performance of copyrighted works.107  
The District Court for the Southern District of New York awarded 
summary judgment for the plaintiffs, enjoining Cablevision from operating 
the RS-DVR without first obtaining licenses from the content providers.108 
On appeal however, the Second Circuit reversed, vacated and remanded, 
holding that Cablevision’s RS-DVR system “would not directly infringe on 
plaintiffs’ exclusive right to reproduce and publicly perform their 
copyrighted works.”109 Of apparent importance to the Second Circuit’s ruling 
was the operation of the RS-DVR technology. The court’s opinion describes, 
in detail, the platform Cablevision used to record and retransmit 
programming to its subscribers.110 Since this analysis remains important in 
the recent ABC v. Aereo case (discussed supra), a summary of the technology 
is relevant.111 
In the typical scenario, Cablevision gathered programming from its 
various content providers and transmitted it to subscribers in real time via a 
“single stream” of data.112 By way of illustration, imagine that a subscriber 
wanted to watch HBO’s “Game of Thrones” Sunday evening at 9:00 p.m. 
Cablevision received a data transmission of the program from HBO at 9:00 
p.m. and immediately re-transmitted the data to the subscriber in a single 
stream. With the advent of the RS-DVR feature however, that single stream 
of data was broken into two separate streams.113 The first data stream, as 
before, was provided immediately to the subscribers who watched Game of 
Thrones in “real time.” The second stream moved through a data buffer onto 
                                                   
105 Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 Id.; see Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F.Supp. 2d 607 
(S.D. N.Y. 2007). 
109 Id .at 140. 
110 Id. at 124-26. 
111 See ABC v. Aereo Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013). 
112 Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124.   
113 Id.  
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a server located at a Cablevision facility.114 There, the server determined if 
any subscribers had selected to record Game of Thrones. If a subscriber 
indicated she wished to record the program, the second data stream moved to 
a secondary buffer and onto a portion of a hard disk allocated specifically to 
that subscriber.115 After the RS-DVR subscriber recorded the program, a 
copy of that program resided on the hard disk of the Cablevision server.116 
When the subscriber wished to watch Game of Thrones she called the 
program up using the remote and accessed the copy of the program through 
the Cablevision server.117  
Through this process plaintiffs claimed that two of their rights under the 
Copyright Act were implicated. First, “‘the right to reproduce the 
copyrighted works in copies,’ which occurred when the subscriber recorded 
the program.118 Second, the right ‘to perform the copyrighted works 
publicly,’” which occurred when the subscriber viewed the recorded 
program.119 The court recognized that in order for a violation of the 
Copyright Act to occur two requirements must be met. First, “the work must 
be embodied in a medium, i.e., placed in a medium such that it can be 
perceived, reproduced, etc. from that medium.”120 Second, “it must remain 
thus embodied ‘for a period of more than transitory duration.’”121 The court 
concluded that because the program data only resided in the buffer for a few 
seconds (1.2 seconds to be precise) it was merely transitory in nature and 
therefore the operation of the RS-DVR did not create “copies” as defined by 
the Copyright Act.122 Moreover, the court concluded that the copy that 
remained on the hard disk after a program was recorded was attributable to 
the subscriber, not Cablevision.123 Regarding the question of whether or not 
the playback of the RS-DVR was a “public performance” in violation of the 
Act, the court held it was not, because the RS-DVR “only makes one 
transmission to one subscriber using a copy made by that subscriber.”124  
                                                   
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 124-25. 
116 Id. at 130. 
117 Id. at 125. 
118 Id. at 126 (citing 17 U.S.C. §106(1),(4)). 
119 Id.  
120 Id at 127; see also 17 U.S.C. §101. 
121 Id. (citing 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §8.02[B][3], at 
8-32 (2007)). 
122 Id. at 130. 
123 Id. at 133. 
124 Id. at 134-37 citing 17 U.S.C. §106(4). 
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The Second Circuit’s decision in Cablevision was criticized for reasons 
ranging from the court’s interpretation of the “transitory duration”125 to its 
finding that the replay of the program was not a public performance.126 
Scholars accurately prognosticated the likelihood of further litigation arising 
from the Cablevision decision.127 As predicted, less than 5 years later, the 
Second Circuit and ultimately the Supreme Court would again be confronted 
with the limits of digital recordings in the Aereo case discussed below.128  
 
V. NETWORK NEUTRALITY 
 
Imagine, for a moment, that private American highway companies 
reserved a lane for Ford cars. That would be good for Ford, but 
obviously would affect competition as between Ford and General 
Motors. It would also slow innovation– for it would no longer be 
the best car that wins, but the one that signs the best deal and slows 
down their competitors. The race is no longer to build a better car, 
but to fight for a better deal with the highway company.129 
 
                                                   
125 Daniel J. Buller, Copyright Infringement in the Ether: RAM Buffering and the Copyright 
Act’s Duration Requirement, 59 KAN. L. REV. 659 (March 2011) (noting that the court’s 
timeline analysis is fraught with problems and provides little guidance to future courts). 
126  Jeffrey Malkan, The Public Performance Problem in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc., 89 OR. L. REV. 505 (2010) (stating “[t]he transmission of a performance of an 
RS-DVR copy to an individual’s cable box, even though that transmission will go only to one 
subscriber, should have been found to be a public performance because RS-DVR will be an 
interactive service that will enable public performances to be received by subscribers who pay 
for the convenience of receiving their performances (or, if you will, accessing their RS-DVR 
copies) in “separate places” and at ‘different times.’”). 
127 Christopher Vidiksis, How to Buffer Your Way Out of a Scrape: Potential Abuse of the 
Cartoon Network v. Cablevision Decision, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 139 (Fall 2009) 
(noting “[t]he decision will likely increase future litigation over whether copyright 
infringement has occurred when data is quickly overwritten or obtained through the use of 
buffers.”); see also Zohar Efroni, The Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings & Cablevision 
Systems, STANFORD LAW SCH. CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOC’Y (Aug. 2008) 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2008/08/cartoon-network-v-csc-holdings-cablevision-
systems; Jesse Harman, Drawing a Line Between Direct and Contributory Copyright 
Infringement: The Second Circuit’s Take on a Copying Service Provider’s Direct Liability in 
Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, 19 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 397 (Spring 
2009) (expressing agreement with court’s reasoning but asserting that the court failed to 
foreclose direct infringement claims against providers of copying technology). 
128 See 712 F.3d 676.  
129 Network Neutrality: Competition, Innovation, and Nondiscriminatory Access, Hearing 
before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary Telecom and Antitrust Task Force, 109th Congress 
(2006) (prepared statement of Tim Wu, Professor, Columbia School of Law). 
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For proponents of Network Neutrality, like Tim Wu, who both coined 
the term130 and provided the car analogy to describe a world without it, the 
desire to have the government ensure that all traffic on the internet moves at 
the same speed regardless of who owns it is a continuation of the de facto 
condition of the internet that has existed since it was first developed. 
However, the formalization of Network Neutrality as a regulatory 
requirement has been aggressively challenged in recent years.131 The policy’s 
fate has important implications for Cord Cutters that this section will explore 
by first describing the circumstances that lead to this controversy, then 
examining the current state of the law, and finally considering the 
consequences of the end of Network Neutrality for consumers.  
 
A. Rise of the Net Neutrality Controversy 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the internet was different in two important ways: 
first, the content did not directly compete with television or cable television 
services; and second, access to it was generally purchased from companies 
using leased telephone lines to provide a stand-alone service.132 
Consequently, there was no market reason for any company providing access 
to the internet to be concerned about what was being delivered over these 
new internet connections.133 The evolution of technology to its current state 
and the competitive forces of the marketplace have radically changed that 
dynamic.  
Today, there is no content than can be thought of as purely internet, 
telephone, or cable content. Both cable and telephone companies sell 
packages of video services, telephone services and internet access, known as 
the “bundle.” In any given geographic area, the direct competition for a 
bundle of cable services will not come from another cable company but 
rather from a telephone company.134  For example, the cable company 
Comcast does not compete with the cable company Time Warner Cable but, 
                                                   
130 See generally Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L 141 (2003). 
131 See Gerald R. Faulhaber, The Economics of Network Neutrality: Are “Prophalactic” 
Remedies to Nonproblems Needed?, REGULATION, Winter 2011-12, at 18 (describing the 
economic policy rationale for opposing net neutrality regulation). 
132 See J. Scott Marcus, Network Neutrality: The Roots of the Debate in the United States, 
INTERECONOMICS, January/February 2008, at 30. 
133 See the discussion of Broadband, supra. 
134 J. Scott Marcus, Network Neutrality: The Roots of the Debate in the United States, 
INTERECONOMICS, January/February 2008, at 30, 34. 
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depending on the market, may compete with either the telephone company 
AT&T or the telephone company Verizon.135 
Telephone and cable companies invested billions of dollars to build the 
infrastructure that allows them to compete with each other.136 When the 
investments in infrastructure were made, it looked like the battle to sell 
customers a bundle of services would be a two-horse race. That assumption 
turned out to be painfully wrong. 
It seems unimaginable today but there was a time when it was unclear 
whether the internet could ever be used to deliver video. The conventional 
wisdom was that it might be able to do so for short video clips, delivered at a 
low resolution.137 That kind of video delivery might make the internet a 
useful marketing tool but it did not look like it would ever be a direct 
competitor to the established video service providers. That too turned out to 
be painfully wrong. 
As the technology and infrastructure improved, the type of content that 
could be offered on the internet evolved. Not only can consumers watch 
online video, they can have multiple streams of high definition, movie-length 
video coming into their homes, using the average high speed internet service 
offered by their cable or telephone company to access services like Netflix, 
Hulu, and Amazon Prime, providing all the video they need at a fraction of 
the cost of traditional cable packages.138 
This development limits revenue growth for cable and telephone 
companies. It may also begin to cut into existing revenue if more customers 
become Cord Cutters. The problem, from the perspective of telephone and 
cable companies, is that the internet-based video providers are making 
millions of dollars using their infrastructure for free in order to offer a 
product that directly competes with their business. The solution, they believe, 
is to force those online video services to pay for the bandwidth used to 
deliver their product which requires an end to net neutrality. 
 
  
                                                   
135 See generally Miriam Gottfried, Comcast, Time Warner Cable Use Wide-Angle Deal Lens, 
WALL ST. J. ONLINE (April 9, 2014, 5:09pm) 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303873604579491900136138052. 
136 NCTA, Platform: Technology, TV and the Future, NAT’L CABLE & TELECOMM. ASSOC. 
(Jan. 27, 2014) https://www.ncta.com/platform/public-policy/why-its-a-good-thing-that-
broadband-isnt-a-common-carrier (asserting that cable broadband providers have invested 
more than $210 billion in their networks since 1996). But cf. Brendan Greeley, America’s 10-
Year Experiment in Broadband Investment Has Failed, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK  (Feb. 20, 
2014) http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-02-20/americas-10-year-experiment-in-
broadband-investment-has-failed (describing the level of investment in broadband in 
comparison to other countries). 
137 See supra notes 51-54. 
138 See the discussion of Broadband and The Rise of Netflix and Its Imitators, supra. 
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B. Legal Challenges to Net Neutrality 
 
The roots of the legal challenges surrounding net neutrality are largely a 
matter of classification. What is broadband internet access? Is it a 
telecommunications service? Is it an information service? The answer to 
those questions determines how much authority the FCC will have to 
regulate high speed internet access offered by both cable and telephone 
companies. Those two categories, telecommunications services and 
information services, were defined within the Telecommunications Act of 
1996.139 Under Title II of the Act, Telecommunications Services are 
regulated as common carriers, which requires, among other things, that they 
charge reasonable rates and allow other entities to connect to their 
network.140 In contrast, information services are not regulated as common 
carriers, “though the Commission has jurisdiction to impose additional 
regulatory obligations under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction.”141 
Although the Telecommunications Act of 1996 created two clearly 
defined categories, it did not specify how newly developing broadband 
internet service should be classified, leaving that determination to the FCC. 
In a Declaratory Ruling issued in March 2002, the FCC decreed that 
broadband services were not telecommunications services but rather 
information services which made them exempt from common carrier 
requirements.142 “Numerous parties petitioned for judicial review, 
challenging the Commission’s conclusion….[b]y judicial lottery, the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was selected as the venue for the 
challenge.”143 
In the Brand X case the Ninth Circuit ruled against the FCC, vacating 
the determination that broadband services were not telecommunication 
services. In reaching that conclusion, the Ninth Circuit failed to apply the 
Chevron framework, which requires deference to the agency interpretation of 
ambiguous statutes.144 Consequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
hearing the case in 2005.145 
The Supreme Court ruled that the FCC determination that broadband 
services were not telecommunications services merited Chevron deference 
despite the respondent’s argument that the agency’s interpretation had 
changed over time. The decision indicated that: 
                                                   
139 NCTA v. Brand X, 545 U.S. 967, 975 (2005); see Pub. L. No. 104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 976. 
142 Id. at  977-78.  
143 Id. at  979. 
144 Id. at  980; see also Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
145 Brand X, 545 U.S. at  980. 
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Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the 
agency’s interpretation under the Chevron framework. Unexplained 
inconsistency is, at most, a reason for holding an interpretation to 
be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice under 
the Administrative Procedure Act. For if the agency adequately 
explains the reasons for a reversal of policy, change is not 
invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the 
discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the 
implementing agency.146 
 
Ultimately, in the Brand X case, the FCC successfully defended its own 
determination that it did not have the responsibility, or the right, to impose 
common carrier requirements on broadband internet services. That 
determination, as well as the principles articulated in this case regarding the 
correct application of the Chevron framework, is of continuing importance in 
the legal and policy challenges involving Network Neutrality.  
From a regulatory perspective, the first significant articulation of the 
network neutrality principles appeared in 2004, when FCC Chairman 
Michael Powell outlined four significant principles that were formalized one 
year later as the Internet Policy Statement.147 It is important to note that the 
concept of network neutrality did not first arise when these principles were 
outlined. network neutrality had been a widely shared value and the de facto 
rule applied to the internet since its inception. The Internet Policy Statement 
only became necessary when it appeared that network neutrality could be 
undermined or threatened. The network neutrality principles included a right 
to access any lawful content, to use applications, to attach personal devices, 
and to obtain service plan information.148   
In 2007, a formal complaint was filed with the FCC against Comcast 
Corporation for violating the Internet Policy Statement by interfering with 
consumers’ use of their high speed internet service to access peer-to-peer file 
sharing content.149 The FCC ruled that Comcast had interfered, that the 
company had other viable options to manage its network, and that the 
interference violated federal policy. Comcast challenged that ruling on a 
variety of grounds but the Court resolved the case purely on the basis of the 
                                                   
146 Id. at  981 (Internal citations omitted). 
147 20 FCC Rcd 14986 (2005). 
148 Michael Powell, Chairman, FCC, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the 
Industry, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N (Feb. 8, 2004), available at http://go.usa.gov/8CZe 
(Referenced in FCC 14-61 at 93) 
149 Comcast v. FCC, 600 F 3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010). See also In Re Formal Compl. of 
Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer 
Applications, 23 F.C.C.R 13,028 (2008) (Order). 
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jurisdictional issue.150 The FCC argued that regulation of Comcast’s network 
management should be permitted based on the ancillary jurisdiction granted 
in Section 4(i) of the Communications Act of 1934 which allows the agency 
to “[m]ake such rules and regulations, and issue such orders….as may be 
necessary in the execution of its functions.”151 The Court rejected that 
position because the FCC failed to “[t]ie its assertion of ancillary authority 
over Comcast’s Internet service to any statutorily mandated 
responsibility.”152 
In 2010, the FCC tried again to assert its authority to preserve network 
neutrality by issuing the Open Internet Order which adopted three rules: (1) 
transparency, requiring broadband providers to disclose their network 
management practices, (2) anti-blocking, prohibiting the blocking of lawful 
content, and (3) anti-discrimination, prohibiting unreasonable discrimination 
in the transmission of lawful traffic.153 The transparency requirement allowed 
consumers to be aware of the ways that their broadband provider manages 
the traffic in their network. The anti-blocking provision prohibited a 
broadband provider from preventing a consumer from accessing the content 
of their choice, while the anti-discrimination provision forbade broadband 
providers from unreasonably slowing down some content while allowing 
other content to transverse their networks unimpeded. 
Verizon challenged the Open Internet Order based on both the FCC’s 
lack of statutory authority and the violation of a statutory provision 
preventing the imposition of common carrier requirements on broadband 
providers.154 Both of these issues were addressed on the merits by the D.C 
Court of Appeals in resolving the case, avoiding “additional contentions that 
the Order violates the First Amendment and constitutes an uncompensated 
taking.”155 The Court found that the FCC did have statutory authority to 
regulate broadband providers based on the agency’s reinterpretation of 
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.156 However, the Court 
also determined that the manner in which the agency elected to regulate 
broadband providers imposed per se common carrier obligations in violation 
of the Communications Act of 1934.157 Consequently, the anti-blocking and 
                                                   
150 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 645. 
151 Id.; see generally United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); United 
States v. Midwest Video Corp. 440 U.S. 649 (1972); and FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 
U.S. 689 (1979) (interpreting the extent of the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction). 
152 Comcast, 600 F.3d. at 661 (quoting Am. Library v. FCC, 406 F.3d at 692 for the language 
“statutorily mandated responsibility”). 
153 In re Preserving the Open Internet, 25 F.C.C.R. 17905, 17906 (2010). 
154 See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
155 Id. at  634. 
156 Id. at  649.  
157 Id. at  657-58. 
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anti-discrimination provisions of the Open Internet Order were vacated, 
leaving only the disclosure rule in force.158 
The January 2014 decision in the Verizon case forced the FCC to once 
again consider the available options for protecting network neutrality. Based 
on the guidance from the Court in the Verizon case, there are at least two 
options: adopting less stringent rules that do not impose a per se common 
carrier obligation, relying on the Section 706 of the Telecommunications 
Act, or reclassifying broadband access as a telecommunication service which 
would allow it to be regulated as a common carrier under the existing law. 
Both options are considered in a May 2014 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
issued by the FCC that solicits public input.159 It is unclear what the final rule 
will be but the risk is that the approach will either be ineffective in protecting 
network neutrality or be struck down by the court, again. Neither option 
results in strong protection for network neutrality, which has profound 
implications for Cord Cutters and the businesses that are creating innovative 
new products to serve them. 
 
C. Impact of Weak or Non-Existent Net Neutrality Policies on 
Cord Cutters 
 
In the absence of network neutrality, companies that provide services to 
Cord Cutters will have to secure agreements and pay fees to broadband 
providers, which will have to be recouped through higher prices or a less 
robust product. Either way, the options will be less favorable for consumers. 
Given the ability to purchase “fast lane”160 access to consumers, some of 
those companies will gain an advantage over their competitors. This process 
will favor larger, better established players at the expense of innovative new 
entrants.161  
For example, Netflix and Amazon Prime might compete to negotiate the 
best deal with Comcast, offering money in exchange for better access to 
                                                   
158 Id. at 659. 
159 In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, FCC 14-61, ¶4 (May 15, 2014). 
160 FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler’s initial proposal for revised net neutrality rules would 
prohibit blocking but allow paid prioritization, or the creation of “fast lanes.”  See generally 
Brendan Sasso, FCC Chief Danes and Dodges on Plan for Internet Fast Lanes, NATI’L 
JOURNAL (May 20, 2014) http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/fcc-chief-dances-and-dodges-
on-plan-for-internet-fast-lanes-20140520. 
161 See generally Marvin Ammori, The Case for Net Neutrality, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
(July/August 2014) http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/138591 (discussing the potential for 
internet services in the absence of net neutrality to evolve to resemble the traditional cable 
television model requiring new companies to give up equity stakes or not reach the market). 
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consumers.162 If Netflix is successful, the company will gain a substantial 
advantage in the marketplace that is independent of the quality of their 
product and the preferences of consumers. Consequently Amazon Prime will 
be positioned at a significant disadvantage. However, the worst outcome 
under this scenario is reserved for the company whose name is not yet 
known, the next generation video provider that may never make it into the 
marketplace. Consumers will have a choice between a more expensive 
product from Netflix or a less desirable product from Amazon due to 
delivery speed and consequent image quality and responsiveness issues. New 
players will be unlikely.  
Despite their attempts to collect fees from companies like Netflix in 
order to allow them to deliver content to consumers, broadband providers are 
also moving in the direction of charging consumers more for internet access 
based on usage.163 Ultimately, consumers may have to pay more for both the 
services they choose to subscribe to and for access to the internet. 
 
VI. AFTER CABLE (A.C.) - THE GORILLA IN THE ROOM –  
THE AEREO SAGA 
 
The latest chapter in the ongoing legal saga of content delivery 
mechanisms is ABC v. Aereo.164 Entrepreneur Chet Kanojia launched Aereo 
in February of 2012.165 According to its rather carefully worded website: 
Aereo’s “technology provides a consumer the ability to use a remotely 
located individual antenna to access free-to-air broadcasts, make a personal 
copy of a program on a remote DVR and play back that copy only to him or 
herself.”166 Specifically, the Aereo system works by capturing live over-the-
air broadcast signals from networks like ABC, NBC and CBS using a tiny 
                                                   
162 Netflix has signed an agreement with Comcast, paying in exchange for faster delivery to 
consumers, while continuing to fight for Network Neutrality.  Comcast broadband customers 
experienced a slowdown in the delivery of Netflix prior to the agreement and then a surge in 
the delivery speed when the deal was completed. See Max Ehrenfreund, This Hilarious Graph 
of Netflix Speeds Shows the Importance of Net Neutrality, WASHINGTON POST, (April 25, 2014, 
11:20am) http://knowmore.washingtonpost.com/2014/04/25/this-hilarious-graph-of-netflix-
speeds-shows-the-importance-of-net-neutrality/. 
163 See Amadou Diallo, Comcast to Cord-Cutters: You Should Pay More, FORBES, (May 15, 
2014 at 10:29am) http://www.forbes.com/sites/amadoudiallo/2014/05/15/comcast-to-cord-
cutters-you-should-pay-more/. 
164 Id.; see also ABC v. Aereo Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
165 See Love is in the Aereo, Presenting our Mission and Team as we Reach for the Sky, 
AEREO (Feb. 14, 2012), http://blog.aereo.com/2012/02/. 
166 See Protect my Antenna, PROTECT MY ANTENNA, http://protectmyantenna.org/ (last visited 
July 9, 2014). 
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remote antenna.167 These fingernail-sized antennas, one for each subscriber, 
are stored in server centers located within the local markets that Aereo 
serves. Subscribers not only can use the antenna to watch live television 
broadcasts, but they can also record the broadcasts to watch later using a 
cloud-based DVR system.168 Aereo does not have a license from copyright 
holders to record or retransmit their programs.169 
The legal battle over the copyright implications of Aereo’s technology is 
hardly surprising.170 Aereo’s founder and chief Kanojia anticipated the 
impending litigation, noting in a February 2012 interview with the New York 
Times, “[w]e understand that when you try to take something meaningful on, 
you have to be prepared for challenges.”171 These “challenges” would soon 
bring Aereo and its service delivery methods squarely before the United 
Stated Supreme Court.  
On March 1, 2012, Fox and PBS filed the first Complaints against 
Aereo in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. ABC, 
CBS and NBC soon followed suit.172 All plaintiffs filed a consolidated 
motion for preliminary injunction, claiming Aereo was directly liable for 
copyright infringement by publicly performing plaintiffs’ copyrighted 
works.173 They asked the court to enjoin the portion of Aereo’s service 
whereby subscribers could view plaintiffs’ copyrighted television programs 
concurrently with the over-the-air broadcast of the program.174 In contrast, 
Aereo argued that its content delivery was protected by Cablevision, stating: 
 
[L]ike the RS-DVR system in Cablevision, its system creates 
unique, user-requested copies that are transmitted only to the 
                                                   
167 Steve Kovach, TV Networks Are So Scared About This App, They’re Taking It All The Way 
To The Supreme Court, BUSINESS INSIDER, (April 22, 2014) 
http://www.businessinsider.com/aereo-2014-4?op=1#ixzz31oIxRmYL. 
168 Id.   
169 ABC v. Aereo, 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013) (this case represents the consolidated cases of 
Fox, PBS, ABC, CBS and NBC). 
170 See Nathan Ingraham, Aereo Launching Streaming Braodcast TV Service in NYC on March 
14, THE VERGE, (February 14, 2012), http://www.theverge.com/2012/2/14/2797616/aereo-
streaming-broadcast-tv-pilot-launch-nyc. (noting “networks likely won’t take kindly to a 
service that could move consumers away from cable and lower the fees they receive from 
providers.”); see also Brian Stelter, New Service Will Stream Local TV Stations in New York. 
NEW YORK TIMES, (February 14, 2012), available at 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/new-service-will-stream-local-tv-stations-
in-new-york/?scp=2&sq=Aereo&st=cse. 
171 See Brian Stelter, supra note 170; see also Beth Carter, Introducing Aereo: One Small Step 
for Cord Cutting, One Giant Leap of Faith, WIRED, (February 14, 2012), 
http://www.wired.com/2012/02/aereo-cord-cutting/. 
172 See ABC v. Aereo, 874 F.Supp.2d 373 (S.D. N.Y. 2012). 
173 Id.  
174 Id. at 375. 
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particular user that created them and, therefore, its performances 
are nonpublic. Moreover, Aereo submits that because each of its 
antennas function independently, even if the Court adopts 
Plaintiffs’ view that these copies are not legally significant, an 
injunction still should not issue because each user is receiving a 
distinct transmission generated by their own individually rented 
antenna.175 
 
Plaintiffs countered by arguing that Cablevision was not dispositive 
because Aereo’s technology was nothing more then a “technological 
gimmick” used to transmit plaintiffs’ copyrighted content to the public.176 
Specifically, plaintiffs claimed: 
 
[B]ecause Aereo’s subscribers are watching these programs as they 
are still being broadcast, they are not using the copies Aereo creates 
for “times-shifting” and these copies therefore do not ‘break[ ] the 
chain of the [over-the-air] transmission’ received by Aereo. Thus, 
Plaintiffs contend, Aereo is engaged in a public performance that 
“emanates from the original broadcast signal” much like a 
“community antenna” which simply passes along a broadcast signal 
to the public.177  
 
The court dismissed plaintiff’s argument pursuant to Cablevision, 
finding that “the copies Aereo’s system creates are not materially 
distinguishable from those in Cablevision.”178 Accordingly the court denied 
plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction.179  
The Second Circuit affirmed, again relying on Cablevision.180 After 
weighing whether Aereo’s service infringed on plaintiffs’ public 
performance right under the Copyright Act, the court concluded that it did 
not. Rather, it found that Aereo’s transmissions were “unique copies” of 
broadcast programs that were “created at its users’ request and transmitted 
while the programs were still airing on broadcast television.”181 As such, the 
court held that they were not “public performances” under the Copyright 
Act.182 Judge Chin dissented, distinguishing the case from Cablevision, as 
                                                   
175 Id. at 385. 
176 Id.  
177 Id. at 385 (citing brief for plaintiffs at 22-23; reply brief for plaintiffs at 10 &14). 
178 Id at 386. 
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180 ABC v. Aereo, 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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well as arguing that the plain meaning of the Copyright Act and the 
legislative history commanded a different result.183  
Plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari. On 
January 10, 2014, the Supreme Court granted cert.184 The nuances of the 
parties’ arguments are perhaps best captured in the “question presented” 
sections of their respective briefs. There, Aereo likened its business model to 
that of an “equipment provider,” whereby the individual user utilizes 
equipment provided to them by Aereo to make a personal copy of over-the-
air broadcast programming: 
 
Whether Aereo “perform[s] ... publicly,” under §101 and §106 of 
the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§101, 106, by supplying remote 
equipment that allows a consumer to tune an individual, remotely 
located antenna to a publicly accessible, over-the-air broadcast 
television signal, use a remote digital video recorder to make a 
personal recording from that signal, and then watch that 
recording.185 
 
In contrast, petitioners analogized Aereo’s business to that of a provider 
permitting unauthorized retransmissions of copyrighted programming. 
Accordingly, petitioners stated the question before the Court as:  
 
Whether a company “publicly performs” a copyrighted television 
program when it retransmits a broadcast of that program to 
thousands of paid subscribers over the Internet.186 
 
Oral arguments were held on April 22, 2014. During oral argument the 
Justices first engaged in a line of questioning as to why Aereo was not 
considered a “cable company,” reasoning that if Aereo were a cable company 
it would be forced to obtain compulsory licenses and the public performance 
issue would become moot.187 For the remainder of the argument the Justices 
focused heavily on the issue of whether a ruling for petitioners would imperil 
                                                   
183 Id. at 705. 
184 ABC v. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014) 
185 See brief for respondents, question presented, (March 26, 2014), 
http://protectmyantenna.org/pdf/2_aereos_briefs/Aereo%20Response%20Brief%20(March%2
026,%202014)%20FINAL%20FILED-1.pdf . 
186 See brief for petitioners, question presented, (February 24, 2014), 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/13-461-ts.pdf. 
187 See oral argument transcript, at 5-6 (wherein Justice Sotomayor stated “[d]o we have to go 
to all of those other questions if we find that they’re a cable company? We say they’re a 
capable company, they get the compulsory license.”). 
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the cloud-computing business.188 In fact, the Justices seemed to have little 
concern for Aereo’s business—stating at one point that Aereo’s 
“technological model is based solely on circumventing legal prohibitions that 
you don’t want to comply with. . .”189  
It came as little surprise that on June 25, 2014, the Supreme Court ruled 
against Aereo in a 6-3 decision.190 Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, 
first addressed whether Aereo’s method of retransmission was a 
“performance” pursuant to the Copyright Act.191 Relying heavily on the 
legislative history and purpose of the Copyright Act, the Court concluded 
that Aereo was more than a mere equipment supplier from which users could 
generate personal copies of a broadcast.192 Rather, it concluded that Aereo’s 
conduct was precisely what the Copyright Act had intended to prevent and 
was therefore considered a “performance” under the Act.193 In evaluating 
whether that performance was “public” pursuant to the Act, the majority 
found that it was, stating: when “Aereo transmits from the same or separate 
copies, it performs the same work; it shows the same images and makes 
audible the same sounds. Therefore, when Aereo streams the same television 
program to multiple subscribers, it ‘transmit[s] . . . a performance’ to all of 
them.”194 
In attempting to distinguish Aereo from the cloud-computing businesses 
the Court so zealously wished to safeguard, the Court emphasize the limited 
nature of its holding, stating: “we have not considered whether the public 
performance right is infringed when the user of a service pays primarily for 
something other than the transmission of copyrighted works, such as the 
remote storage of content.”195  
                                                   
188 Id. at 6-7, 12-15, 17-18, (April 22, 2014). 
189 Id. at 41-42 (Chief Justice Roberts stating: “All I’m trying to get at, and I’m not saying it’s 
outcome determinative or necessarily bad, I’m just saying your technological model is based 
solely on circumventing legal prohibitions that you don’t want to comply with, which is fine. I 
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190  See ABC v. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
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192 Id. at 10. 
193 Id. at 5-10. (The Court engaged in an extensive discussion of Fortnightly Corp. v. United 
Artists Television, Inc., 392 U. S. 390 (1968) and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U. S. 394 (1974), noting that Congress amended the Copyright 
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94–1476, pp. 86–87 (1976) (The 1976 amendments overturned the Court’s narrow 
construction of the Act in Fortnightly and Teleprompter). 
194 Id. at 14.    
195 Id. at 16 (additionally stating: “the history of cable broadcast transmissions that led to the 
enactment of the Transmit Clause informs our conclusion that Aereo “perform[s],” but it does 
not determine whether different kinds of providers in different contexts also.”); but see ABC 
v. Aereo, No. 13–461, dissent slip op. at 11 (June 25, 2014), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13-461_l537.pdf. (The dissent, written by 
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A few days after the Court’s decision, Chet Kanojia informed 
subscribers in an email that Aereo “decided to pause our operations 
temporarily as we consult with the court and map out our next steps.”196 It 
seems, at least according to Kanojia, that Aereo may not be dead yet.197  
 
VII. A.C. – PREDICTIONS FOR THE AFTER CABLE ERA. 
 
A. Unbundling 1- Cable Adapts? 
 
Cable operators currently offer packages of channels arranged to reflect 
the company’s priorities in terms of profit and reciprocal relationships with 
other video service providers. Cable consumers who wish to remain cable 
consumers have had only two choices: forego subscription video services 
entirely or order “bundles” of channels from a preselected menu offered by 
the cable company. In an unbundled marketplace, consumers would choose 
from a variety of channel providers without the intercession of a cable 
operator. In theory this policy would provide consumers with the ability to 
build their own package or lineup. 
The term “unbundling” has been used to describe the consumer push for 
cable companies to offer channels on an à la carte basis rather than the 
current practice of packaging the channels together, effectively forcing the 
consumer to purchase all of the bundled channels even if only one or two 
channels in that bundle are of interest to that customer.198  A bill currently 
before Congress, the Television Consumer Freedom Act of 2013199 would: 
 
[Allow] multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) 
(including cable operators, multichannel multipoint distribution 
services, direct broadcast satellite services, or television receive-
                                                                                                                        
Justice Scalia and joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, warned that while “[t]he Court vows 
that its ruling will not affect cloud-storage providers and cable- television systems. . .  it 
cannot deliver on that promise given the imprecision of its result-driven rule.” ) 
196 Chet Kanojia. CEO, A Letter to Our Consumers: Standing Together for Innovation, 
Progress and Technology - An Update on Aereo, emailed to subscribers on June 28, 2014.  
197 See the discussion of Reactions to Aereo – If You Can’t Beat them…A.C. – Predictions for 
the After Cable Era, infra. 
198 Justin Bachman, The Ugly Numbers Behind Unbundled Cable TV, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, (Dec. 6, 2013) (describing “unbundling” as the offering of cable networks on 
an a la carte basis with an analysis indicating that the cost structure for cable companies 
prevents that option without raising overall costs, resulting in suggestions for consumers to 
consider cord cutting) http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-12-06/the-ugly-numbers-
behind-unbundled-cable-tv.  See also David Leonhardt, Why Unbundling Cable Would Not 
Save You Money, NEW YORK TIMES, (May 15, 2014) (using the term “unbundling” to refer to a 
la carte distribution by cable companies) http://nyti.ms/1mXHC4D.  
199 S.912 — 113th Congress (2013-2014). 
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only satellite program distributors), except with respect to the 
minimum contents of programming required for basic tier service, 
to provide subscribers with any channel of video programming on 
an a la carte basis.200  
 
No movement occurred on the bill in the last Congress, it was last 
referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation in May 
2013 and died in committee.201  There appears to be little support within the 
Congress for measures that would force an à la carte model.  
The traditional providers have little incentive because of the costs 
structures involved to support an à la carte model. “Consumers want to 
choose the channels they get from their pay-TV providers but such a move 
would not only undermine the business model for media companies, it could 
also lead to higher prices for customers.”202 In such an environment it is 
unlikely that the traditional providers will offer unbundling options in order 
to counter Cord Cutting trends. 
 
B. Unbundling 2 – The Do it Yourself Consumer Version 
 
In order to have true choice, consumers need direct access to a variety of 
content providers and a way to manage multiple sources of content that 
preserves the functionality of program menus, digital video recorders, and 
search functions. In the absence of that functionality, the alternative to cable 
may require too much work for the average consumer who may be willing to 
pay a monthly cable bill in exchange for those features. 
Although the potential exists for the current range of options to evolve 
into an unbundled option, many questions remain unanswered. Will 
consumers select their own content or select an alternative content provider? 
Will Netflix or another service provider create a single walled garden for 
consumers that resembles the current cable company offerings in every way 
except for being a non-linear, on-demand style service? What may happen, 
what indeed is happening, is that consumers are unbundling themselves. In 
short, Cord Cutters are disassembling prior entertainment packages and 
instead are assembling disparate sources into a new, customized, personal 
entertainment “bundle.” 
                                                   
200CONGRESS.GOV, S.912 - Television Consumer Freedom Act of 2013, 
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One interesting alternative aggregation technology is Roku, which pulls 
together more than 1,500 streaming “channels” including Netflix, Hulu, and 
Amazon Prime into one easy point and click menu, allowing viewers to 
watch content from the internet on their televisions. Consumers purchase the 
Roku device for $50-100 but do not pay any ongoing user or subscription 
fees. Subscriptions to Netflix, Hulu, Amazon Prime, and others are handled 
by those companies so Roku does not collect any fees from customers. Roku 
does not release sales figures but analysts estimate that more than 8 million 
units have been sold and the service is predicted to grow by 20% in 2014.203 
Apple TV offers a similar device that has sold more than 20 million set-
top despite costing nearly twice as much as a Roku, and allowing access to 
less content.204 Apple TV includes a very popular feature called AirPlay that 
allows users to stream almost any content, including music, photos and 
video, directly from an apple device like an iPhone or an iPad to a 
television.205  
Amazon recently entered the market by launching Fire TV which offers 
a product similar to Roku but with additional features enabled by the 
incredibly well developed Amazon streaming infrastructure and extensive 
content rights. Special features include voice search and an intuitive system 
that begins a download based on prior usage before the consumer requests 
the content.206 
Google’s Chromecast is not a substitute for a set-top box like the 
previously mentioned devices because it lacks a menu, remote control, and 
search function. The $35 dongle that is about the size of a thumb drive is not 
designed to work as a stand-alone device. Instead it is can be used with a 
wide variety of devices including smart phones and tablets to stream video to 
a television.207 Roku has recently introduced a similar product called the 
Streaming Stick.208 
There are a variety of other companies in various stages of development 
trying to establish services to fill the gap for cord-cutting customers 
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including Mohu which will provide a unified program guide for over the air 
channels and internet channels,209 ChannelMaster offers an over-the-Air 
DVR.210  These services are offered without any recurring, subscription fees. 
Several companies also offer services for Cord Cutters that require some 
form of subscription fee. For example, Tivo offers two DVRs that require a 
hardware purchase and then a monthly subscription fee for the program guide 
service.211 
When the innovative devices like those previously profiled are 
combined with content on demand services like Netflix, they create a new set 
of “unbundled” options for consumers who can select the services that 
provide the best combination of value and features to suit their individual 
preferences. This approach may be attractive to consumers for a variety of 
reasons including price, control, content selection, and advanced features.212  
Cable customers have felt trapped by companies whom they believe 
have not been providing a quality service, so they are hungry for an 
alternative.213 However, these new options still depend upon other companies 
to provide a high speed internet connection and quality content. As one 
analyst suggests, “To be successful in the evolving world of media, a 
company needs to control either the content, or the pipes. If it has neither, it’s 
a mere middleman, consigned to low or no profitability.”214 For a company 
like Apple or Amazon, streaming devices are a small part of their business. 
Therefore a lack of profitability could cause them to focus their resources on 
other business lines. But for Roku, streaming devices are their business, so 
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their commitment to same is unlikely to waiver as long as they are an 
ongoing concern. 
Thus, as discussed supra, with these new technologies Cord Cutters are 
disassembling prior entertainment packages and instead are self-assembling 
disparate sources into a new, customized, personal entertainment “bundle.” 
 
C. Reactions to Aereo – If You Can’t Beat Them… 
 
The Aereo215 ruling was a setback to the Cord Cutter movement. 
However, it also serves as shot across the bow of the cable companies.  The 
decision hardly clears the air, and may even raise other, unintended issues: 
 
If the big commercial broadcasters will go to such lengths to keep 
others from retransmitting their programming, should they really be 
treated as broadcasters? Should they continue to get cheap access 
to the broadcast spectrum—the “public airwaves”—and the right to 
force their way into cable system lineups?216  
 
In other words, should the broadcasters stop fighting these nascent 
technologies, and act to replicate the Aereo experience?  In a word, yes.   
[B]roadcast and cable companies should take the Aereo ruling as a 
stay before Congress acts to explicitly legalize competitors such as 
Aereo. In the time they have been given, they should move as fast 
as possible to respond to the clear customer demands that Aereo 
exposed.217 
 
Consumer demand, changing technologies, and increased political 
awareness of the issue will likely conspire to force a legislative denouement 
to the Aereo saga. What the Supreme Court would not grant Congress may. 
The traditional content providers can short circuit this process by essentially 
regulating themselves. If the traditional cable companies can develop a 
model that would out-Aereo Aereo, with their own freely available broadcast 
applications, then they can control advertising, content, and fees. They may 
co-opt the Cord Cutting movement, stave off legislative innovations that may 
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impact their business models, and ride the wave instead of being swamped by 
it.   
But how should Aereo react? In a new twist, in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s Aereo ruling218 Aereo is attempting to join its opponents. In a July 9, 
2014 letter to the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York219 (the Court to which the Aereo case was remanded following the 
Supreme Court’s decision), Aereo argued that the Supreme Court’s decision 
and the language within the Court’s opinion has effectively morphed Aereo 
into a cable company.220 Accordingly, Aereo claims that it is entitled to a 
compulsory license under section 17 U.S.C. §111 of the Copyright Act 
rendering moot the broadcasters’ argument that its transmissions infringe 
their rights under the Act.221 This argument could effectively let Aereo 
circumvent the catastrophic effect of the Supreme Court’s decision to get 
back in the game.    
 
D. Segmentation of the Internet – Data Caps and the Death of Network 
Neutrality 
 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are further hindering cord cutters 
efforts by implementing caps on wireless data usage and preferentially 
exempting some service providers, from these caps. This practice effectively 
creates a “two-tiered Internet” whereby some providers’ content reaches the 
consumer at high speeds while other content gets slower, secondary 
service.222 Public interest groups have criticized such caps as undermining 
network neutrality,223 while they have been staunchly defended by the 
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telecom industry as necessary to provide customers with “high-quality video, 
from particular technology or content companies.”224 The risk of such 
preferential treatment is those startups, nonprofits and other Internet users 
who cannot afford to pay for priority treatment may have their content 
pushed into the slow-lane and cost to consumers may increase.225  
The FCC’s proposed rules on network neutrality ban ISPs from slowing 
down consumer Internet access, but may allow content providers to pay for 
more preferential, or fast-lane, access to consumers.226 (The agency has asked 
the public for comment as to whether it should ban the latter practice as 
“commercially unreasonable.”227) In response to the pending FCC action, 
Democrats unveiled the Online Competition And Consumer Choice Act, 
which would force the FCC to ban Internet “fast lanes.”228 Republicans 
alternatively proposed legislation that would prohibit the FCC from 
reclassifying ISPs as a “common carrier” and therefore limit regulation of the 
industry.229 Cord Cutters must stay tuned to see if, and how, their cord might 
be cut.  
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
The Cord Cutting trend is not abating. As described in this paper 
technology has profoundly changed the entertainment landscape thanks to 
Netflix, Amazon Prime, and their ilk. There will, however, be detours, stops, 
U-turns and obstacles on the way to Cord Cutting ubiquity.  The Aereo case 
raises questions regarding how far third parties may go in assisting individual 
Cord Cutters as they bundle their own entertainment content. The network 
neutrality debate threatens to raise costs for consumers and entertainment 
providers that operate outside of the traditional cable company universe, and 
it threatens to create a class system – a fast lane and a slow lane – on the 
internet. It is also possible but unlikely that the traditional companies will 
adapt, bow to the inevitable, and provide more content at lower prices to the 
public. But in the end, Cord Cutting, with all that it entails for choice, cost 
and freedom, is clearly one thing: the future. 
 
 
